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**Multiple paths to police donations: a fuzzy set analysis of Bulgaian contributions**

In 2011, the Bulgarian Interior Ministry received more donations to the police than ever before--a record exceeding €5 million from businesses and individuals. After condemnation both domestically and internationally, the practice became illegal for individuals and private businesses on September 1, 2011 and made completely illegal in July 2013. Under public pressure, the Interior published its sponsorship statistics, which had been concealed prior to the scandal. Given that this practice transitioned from being legal and commonplace to illegal and publicly condemned within two years' time, along with the ambiguous nature of donations to public servants, we seek to understand its associated contexts. In particular, we ask why some regions of Bulgaria received proportionately more donations to the police than others. To address this question, we draw upon theories from criminology, organizational studies, and economic sociology and test them using fuzzy set analysis on an innovative quantitative dataset that includes 2011 police donations as well as our regional predictor of the phenomenon. We find that a combination of high taxes, cumbersome state regulations, stiffer business competition and strained police proclivity to solve criminal cases considerably increase the probability of higher contributions to the National Police Force.